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By JAMES A. SMITH*
Recent historical studies of the British and American
Bars have identified their professional elites'
willingness to define and enforce a concept of legal
ethics which restricted less fortunate members' ability
to practice and less fortunate individuals' ability to
obtain legal assistance. This essay applies the thesis to
the Canadian Bar's and especially the Law Society of
Upper Canada's use of their increasing control over
professional discipline from 1920 to 1950. Identifying
similar trends in the Canadian profession's evolution,
while emphasizing effects rather than intentions, it
makes similar conclusions about the Canadian
professional elite's use of such powers during this
period.
Des 6tudes historiques r6centes des barreaux
brittaniques et am6ricains ont identifi6 la volont6 de la
part de leurs 61ites professionnelles de d6flair et
renforcer un certain concept d'Ethique lgale. Ce
concept a restraint et l'habilet6 des membres mons
chanceux du barreau de travailler, et l'habilet6 des
individus momns p6cunieux d'obtenir de l'aide lgale.
Dans cet article, l'auteur applique cette these au
barreau canadien, et en particulier au Barreau du
Haut-Canada, et i l'emploi de leur puissance croissante
sur la discipline professionnelle entre 1920 et 1950. B
identifie des courants parallels dans l'dvolution de la
profession au Canada, et, tout en mettent en relief les
effets, sans prendre consid6ration de leurs intentions, il
fait des conclusions semblables A propos de l'usage de
l'Elite professionnelle canadienne de tels pouvoirs
pendant cette 6poque.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, social thinkers and historians shared a common
na'vet6 toward the concepts of "legal ethics" and professional self-
regulation. The former concept, accepted by most, implied a lofty set of
idealistic propositions designed to spur aspiring lawyers' self-
improvement and help them meet their spiritual "call" to service. It
reflected values universally espoused by the profession that existed, as
did the regulatory bodies themselves, both for the practitioners' and the
public's protection. The predominant view held that only these bodies
could properly define and enforce professional conduct, and therefore
the public should accept whatever standards the profession deemed
necessary for its security.
Contemporary analysis has matured, however, in two important
ways. First, the notion of Canadian Law Societies as purely benevolent
protectors of public interest has been abandoned. In dealing with
recurring issues involving the administration of legal aid services and the
profession's disciplinary role,1 academics and the media have attacked
the legitimacy of self-regulation by criticizing professional bodies' ability
to further their own self-interest at the public's expense. Furthermore,
modern thought recognizes that persons of different backgrounds,
interests, and opportunities compose the profession's often stratified
membership. In so doing, it questions the notion of universal
professional values and reveals the governing elites' willingness to
1 R. Haliechuk, "Ontario Benchers in Uproar over Favouritism Charge: By the Narrowest of
Margins, the Law Society of Upper Canada has Voted to Have its Handling of a Professional
Misconduct Complaint Independently Investigated" The Lawyers Weekly (9 February 1990) 10.
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manipulate regulatory policies to the detriment of their less fortunate or
less accepted colleagues.
This essay relies on these developing perspectives in exploring
the manner in which Canadian legal elites asserted themselves as the
Bar's "artificial conscience"2 from 1920 to 1950. Against the background
of similar patterns in Britain and the United States, it concludes that,
throughout this period, regulatory bodies enforced ethical and political
ideologies which were far from universally beneficial to either their
members or the public at large. In this era of growth, changing society,
changing forms of practice, and the Bar's increasing stratification, the
professional values codified in 1920 and thereafter enforced had a
disparate impact on different classes of practitioners. To the elites
defining ethical conduct, prohibitions on solicitor advertising, fee tariff
undercutting, the "stirring" of litigation, and "alien" political beliefs,
maximized the value of the social and corporate connections which
sustained their professional status and upheld their ideology. To those
who lacked similar contacts or maintained unacceptable views, however,
such policies either restricted their ability to compete in crowded
markets or eliminated that right altogether. Moreover, whether
intentional or not, restrictions on available information, inflexibility of
fee arrangements, and the solicitor's role in organizing claims, inhibited
many poorer individuals' ability or willingness to launch valid causes of
action.
This essay does not, as Arthurs puts it, assign "too great a burden
of guilt"3 on the elite governing the profession during this period. It
contemplates the racial prejudices and corporate biases that affected the
elite's decisions but, unlike other studies, it emphasizes effects rather
than intentions. In attaching an "artificial" unprofessionalism to
practices and beliefs not in themselves irreconcilable with the practice of
law, the elitist "conscience" further marginalized disenfranchised
members of the Bar and the public. Although, as Arthurs rightly points
out, it neither created social inequities nor held the power for their
remedy,4 the elite perpetuated such inequities to its own and its clients'
advantage through professional discipline.
2 W.R. Riddell, "A Code of Legal Ethics" (1919) 4 cBA Papers 136 at 142.
3 H.W. Arthurs, Book Review of Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modern
America by J.S. Auerbach (1977) 27 U.TJ-.J. 513 at 516.
4 ibid. at 517.
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II. THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE
As the source of its professional model, the British Inns of Court
and the Law Society provide instructive starting points for analyzing the
Canadian Bar's exercise of disciplinary authority.
A. Inns of Court
Still "an inefficiently organized cottage industry"S at the
beginning of the twentieth century, the Inns nevertheless prescribed an
intricate unwritten code governing barristers' conduct that promoted the
interests of their elites. At the risk of losing the independence which the
Inns felt essential to a barrister's role as a "champion of liberty,"6 a
barrister could not speak to a client without a solicitor's intervention and
could not speak to a solicitor regarding a case unless approached. Any
form of advertising, or "touting," of one's services to solicitors, as well as
fee arrangements contingent on the case's success, detracted from
barristers' gentlemanly calling and from their primary duty as officers of
the Court.
In the stratified British profession, such rules restricted the
prospects of junior members without "family and personal connections
powerful enough to steer barristers' work' 7 in their direction. A young
barrister could do little to establish the professional relationships
necessary for successful practice, especially after Parliament's expansion
of solicitors' rights to appear before lower courts in the 1850s. Excluded
from High Courts by more established senior members and from County
Courts by solicitors' competitive advantages, junior barristers, as Pue
points out, chose survival over ethics:
[T]he only viable means of attaining eminence at the bar for individuals who were not
well connected lay in precisely those sorts of "commercial" practices-direct client
contact, fee cutting, conditional fee arrangements, special commercial arrangements with
clients or attorneys-which were condemned in the dominant model of barristering.
8
5 B. Abel-Smith & R. Stevens, Layers and the Courts: A Sociological Study of the English Legal
System 1750-1965 (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1967) at 242.
6 W.W. Pue, "Moral Panic at the English Bar: Paternal vs. Commercial Ideologies of Legal
Practice in the 1860s" (Winter 1990) 15 L & Soc. Inquiry 49 at 55 [hereinafter "Moral Panic"].
7 W.W. Pue, "Exorcising Professional Demons: Charles Rann Kennedy and the Transition to
the Modern Bar" (Spring 1987) 5 L. & History Rev. 135 at 141 [hereinafter "Exorcising
Professional Demons"].
8 "Moral Panic," supra note 6 at 101.
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Throughout the 1850s, as Pue relates elsewhere, "rebels at the bar"
challenged the artificial nature of barristerial etiquette.9 Many of them
established "commercial" practices and, in 1852, many more petitioned
the Inns "to sweep aside important traditions of professional conduct"10
inhibiting their further success.
As described by Cocks, the Inns' reliance on social pressures to
enforce legal ethics originally rendered most deviants immune from
censure. 11 But when the Benchers decided to flex their disciplinary
authority, they applied it selectively against "a miscellaneous collection
of marginalized"12 individuals with political or professional ideologies
alien to those of the conservative elites. The disbarments of Edwin
James and Digby Seymour, for example, reflect not simply the Bar's
public concern but "political victimization by a conservative professional
aristocracy."13 As Liberal members of Parliament-the former about to
become Attorney-General before his hearing-James and Seymour
proved to be gratifying subjects of the predominantly Tory Benchers'
disciplinary review.
Seymour, moreover, like Charles Claydon and Charles Rann
Kennedy, was one of the rebels engaged in "unprofessional" practices
tacitly accepted in the 1850s. By bringing prominent exemplars of such
practices to professional justice, the Inns publicly reinforced the
concepts which ensured their elites' continued prosperity. While
Claydon was unknown, Seymour had become Queen's Counsel (Q.C.),
despite his documented breaches of etiquette. Kennedy had earned
both fame and the Inns' further contempt by "openly challenging the
integrity of leading barristers and judges" in the "Great Swinfen Case"14
of 1856. At the highly publicized trial, Kennedy not only questioned the
barrister's right to settle a will against a client's wishes, he confronted the
very fabric of barristerial elitism with a "commercial" ideology of
practice.15 Subjecting him and others to the Inns' reproach rendered
9 W.W. Pue, "Rebels at the Bar: English Barristers and the County Courts in the 1850s"
(1987) 16 Anglo-American L. Rev. 303 at 322-52.
10 "Moral Panic," supra note 6 at 56-57.
11 R. Cocks, Foundations of the Modem Bar (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1983) at 15.
12 "Moral Panic," supra note 6 at 116.
13 /bi at 84.
14 "Exorcising Professional Demons," supra note 7 at 155; see also C.R. Kennedy, The Great
Swinfen Case: report of the extraordinary trial at Warwick in the matter of Kennedy v. Brown and Wfe
(London: n.p., 1862).
15 "Exorcising Professional Demons," supra note 7 at 160-61.
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final judgement on the practices such "rebels" adopted. Previously
unenforced etiquette acquired a new vigour and thus reinforced
professional concepts more attuned to the elites' competitive strengths.
Not until the advent of the Bar Council in the 1880s and the
Inns' increasing democratization did the junior Bar acquire the "strong
moral authority"16 necessary to further its members' financial interests.
Rather than overhauling professional codes, however, the Bar Council
merely extended ethical restrictions to accommodate the junior
members' often disadvantaged positions. In 1890, the Bar Council
decided "that it was a generally recognized rule of etiquette that a Q.C.
could not appear at a trial without a junior,"1 7 and that the 2/3 fee-
splitting ratio for such arrangements was a "long established and well-
settled custom."18 To protect junior members' market on the Assizes,
the Council established the propriety of London barristers' demands for
a "special" fee for services performed outside the metropolis. 19
Amendments to barristerial etiquette may have remedied some
disparities between senior and junior members of the Bar but, as Abel-
Smith and Stevens reveal, the profession's "leaders made fortunes,
[while] the average barrister in 1939 did not earn very much."20 The Bar
Council, moreover, refused to re-examine rules which condemned the
"commercial" practices necessary for some of its members' success. It
perpetuated the Bar's stratification by adding, not reducing, rules which
rewarded social connections with success. A junior without links to
senior barristers would remain unaffected by the alterations, while the
potential for advancement of juniors who had limited connections with
solicitors was similarly limited.
B. Law Society
The Law Society used its disciplinary powers in the same
manner. After consolidating its authority over professional discipline
through the Solicitors Act, 188821 and subsequent amendments in 1919,22
16 Abel-Smith & Stevens, supra note 5 at 219.
1 7 1bid at 223.
18Ibid. at 224 [emphasis in the original].
19 bid at 220.
20 1biu at 242-43.
21 (U.K.), 51 & 52 Vict., c. 65.
2 2 Abel-Smith & Stevens, supra note 5 at 188-89.
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the Law Society embarked on an ethical crusade to eliminate
competitive practices among its members. In 1934, it prohibited "the
acceptance by a solicitor of remuneration at less than the statutory or
customary rate with the object or result of attracting ... business."23 By
turning originally maximum fee schedules into ethical minimums, the
Law Society inflated the price of legal services to the benefit of its
established elite. The rule precluded lower fees even if a client's
financial position so warranted and stifled young solicitors' ability to
undercut their competitors through lower prices and greater industry.
The Law Society's attitude toward contingency fees was equally
restrictive in its effects. As Abel-Smith and Stevens relate, the Society
responded to "trade protection" and the prosecution of personal injury
claims during the 1920s and 1930s, by outlawing their methods of
practice:
[R]ules were made under the Solicitors Act of 1933 which prohibited a solicitor from
"prosecuting claims arising in consequence of death or personal injury for a client whose
introduction to him is consequent upon solicitation or is made as a matter of business and
in expectation of reward." The rule was directly aimed at "ambulance chasing." 24
By using "pamphlets, circulars and touts"25 and adopting fee
arrangements contingent on the claims' success, these ambulance-
chasing solicitors secured a livelihood in inhospitable markets for
services. Such practices were deemed unacceptable, however, because
they attracted retainers away from the Society's more established
membership. Like the Inns, the Society justified its abhorrence of
advertising and contingency fees on the basis of protecting the solicitor's
independence as a public servant. Yet it too failed to offer alternatives
to solicitors who, without such practices, might not have had anyone to
serve.
Furthermore, the cumulative effect of the Inns' and the Law
Society's ethical policies was hardly in the public interest. Restrictions
on advertising, for example, might have prevented persons from
realizing the availability of legal redress. Claimants who had such
knowledge still had to pay a solicitor's, a junior barrister's, and a senior
barrister's fees at prices artificially inflated by fee tariff or convention.
Those without the immediate means to pay could not enter into
contingency contracts, and thus many claims were either uneconomical
or impossible for wronged parties to pursue. Marginalized barristers
23 Ibid. at 204.
24IbN& at 196 [footnotes omitted].
25 Ibid. at 139.
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and solicitors were available for such work, but the British Bar
subordinated the interests of both its less-connected members and those
of the vulnerable classes to a professional ideology which sustained the
governing elites' elevated status.
II. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
Auerbach constructs a different model of the American Bar, but
his conclusions with respect to the elite's manipulation of its disciplinary
influence are similar. The American Bar's stratification, he explains, was
based on the corporate, not the aristocratic connection. At the century's
turn, powerful commercial interests, which "required the preventive
techniques of the counselor who spoke to the future," altered the
traditional role of the lawyer as an advocate "who litigated the mistakes
of the past."26 The corporate law firms that arose to accommodate these
interests were "edging to the pinnacle of professional aspiration and
power"27 during this period and, together with corporate directors,
formed a symbiotic elite which consolidated institutional control for
their mutual benefit. The doors to such career opportunities, Auerbach
maintains, "required keys that were distributed according to race,
religion, sex, and ethnicity."28 Jewish, Black, and other ethnic minority
lawyers "sank to the bottom"29 of the profession and formed an
underclass excluded by the corporate elite. This substratum absorbed
much of the profession's tremendous growth in this period,3 0 and
extensive competition ensued for the limited personal injury, probate
and wills, and simple conveyancing work on which these marginalized
practitioners relied.
As in the case of the British Inns and the Law Society, the
American Bar's elite promulgated an ethical ideology that promoted its
own interests over those of its underclass. Around the turn of the
century, expressions of "unease" began to emerge involving two
26 J.S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modem America (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1976) at 23.
2 7Tbid. at 22.
281Jbid.
29 1b1d. at26.
30 CJ. Cole, '1 Learned and Honorable Body": The Professionalization of the Ontario Bar,
1867-1929 (London: University of Western Ontario, 1987) at 329 [hereinafterProfessionalization of
the Ontario Bar].
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concerns over the profession's increasing commercialization.31 One line
of criticism concentrated on the elite's abandonment of its traditionally
immutable independence in favour of corporate subservience. It
foresaw the undesirable consequences of championing money rather
than justice and urged attorneys to develop their professional identities
beyond the narrow scope of corporate interests. The other source of
disapproval was the urban underclass. According to Auerbach, censure
focused on the "commercial" practices which its competitive market
necessitated and "demonstrated antagonism toward lawyers from ethnic
minority groups"3 2 who formed much of the membership of the urban
underclass.
As concerns over declining professional standards gathered
momentum, so did the Bar's desire to codify an ethical ideology. Yet the
media through which it did so, the American and state Bar Associations,
misrepresented the Bar's increasing heterogeneity. Auerbach describes
the corporate elite's stronghold on these institutions of professional
policy:
[B]ar associations, in which they wielded power disproportionate to their professional
numbers, provided an organizational base for their interests, a forum for their views, and
leverage for the implementation of their programs. 33
The American Bar Association (ABA), formed as an exclusive
body in 1878 to further the interests of its elite members, provided the
model for similarly composed state organizations. With the adoption of
canons of ethics in 1908, therefore, their leaders "shifted the onus"34 of
professional concern from corporate lawyers' activities to those of the
underclass, and promoted values which restricted the latter's ability to
cope with their competitive environment.
Auerbach supports his thesis by analyzing three standards of
conduct. The first, Canon 27, declared the "most worthy and effective
advertisement possible ... is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust."35 Yet in
3 1 Auerbach, supra note 26 at 40.
32 1ibU
33 1bid. at 36.
34Ibid at 41.
35 Opinions of the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances with the Canons of
Professional Ethics Annotated and the Canons of Judicial Ethics Annotated (American Bar
Association, 1936) 14 [hereinafter Canons]; see also "American Bar Association Canons of Ethics"
(1919) 4 cBA Papers 14.
1994]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
heralding "character and conduct"3 6 over circulars, personal
communication, or self-praise as the most effective means for solicitors
to achieve success, the Canon ignored the fact that many practitioners
required such methods in order to survive. As a consequence, Auerbach
contends, the rule disparately affected the stratified profession:
It ... rewarded the lawyer whose law-firm partners and social contacts made advertising
unnecessary at the same time that it attributed inferior character and unethical behaviour
to attorneys who could not afford to sit passively in their offices awaiting clients. 3 7
Two canons, aimed specifically at "ambulance-chasing" lawyers, had
similarly negative implications for those without the connections
necessary to sustain a practice. The first prescribed that contingent fees,
"where sanctioned by law, should be under the supervision of the Court,
in order that clients may be protected from unjust charges."38 As such
arrangements had been legalized by the United States Supreme Court in
1877,39 prohibiting contingent fees was impossible. But in merely
accepting them where "sanctioned" and in specifically subjecting them to
judicial review, the rule rendered the contracts on which marginalized
lawyers relied something less than professional.
Canon 28 reflected a more explicit attack on aggressive solicitors.
In barring "stirring up strife and litigation,"40 it specifically
contemplated the type of practice which engaged lawyers marginalized
by the corporate elite:
It is disreputable ... to breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal
injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients. 41
The profession's outrage at "ambulance chasers," intensified by
prejudices toward minorities attracting that title, inspired the ABA's
forceful denunciation of such practices. And while a prohibition on the
hiring of agents, police personnel, and hospital staff to solicit possible
claimants might have been in the public interest, the ABA ignored the
realities of a competitive environment which necessitated and justified
aggressive solicitation. By classifying such activities as "stirring," an
ethical infraction punishable by disbarment, the Canon further
36 Canons, ibid.
3 7 Auerbach, supra note 26 at 43.
38 Canon 13, before 1933 amendment, cited in Canons, supra note 35 at 8.
39 Stanton v. Embry, 93 U.S. 548 (1877).
40 Canons, supra note 35 at 16.
41 pIid
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reinforced the position of elites whose connections rendered the
problem of securing retainers irrelevant.
The ABA's power to enforce its ethical ideology was limited but
not ineffective. Through the state bar associations which adopted its
canons and compensated for its lack of authority, the ABA's elite ensured
that, as in Britain, disciplinary actions focused on alien individuals or
those with political ideologies contrary to the elite's own. An
"ambulance-chasing" investigation conducted in New York in 1929
clearly reveals the administrators' ethnic intolerance in their
recommendations to disbar seventy-four lawyers:
[T]he chief counsel pointedly observed that some attorneys who had testified "could not
speak the King's English correctly ... These men by character, by background, by
environment, by education were unfitted to be lawyers." 42
Expulsion of uneducated lawyers, whose negligence could only cause
further legal problems, was clearly in the public interest. Additional
ethnic prejudices, however, eradicated the discipline procedure's
neutrality. During and after World War I, Auerbach relates,
"professional leaders waged a crusade against radicals, aliens, foreign-
born citizens, and native-born members of ethnic minority groups."43
Two lawyers in Pennsylvania and Idaho, for example, were disbarred
after organizing opposition to the draft. A Washington lawyer was
similarly disciplined when he was discovered speaking for a radical
political organization, the Industrial Workers of the World, at a public
rally.44 In each case, the bar punished persons for criticizing the values
espoused by its elite. The bar allowed bigotry and ideology to dominate
its concepts of professionalism and thereby revealed its governing
members' willingness to define ethical conduct by standards unrelated to
the practice of law.
The bar associations' policies marginalized vulnerable
individuals as well as vulnerable practitioners. By restricting
dissemination of available information and more aggressive solicitation,
the canons may well have prevented potential claimants from
discovering actionable wrongs and obtaining legal assistance. With
contingency contracts tolerated and the profession joined, poorer
individuals could perhaps more readily pursue a claim in the United
States than in Britain. Yet, as Auerbach points out, the American Bar
had a greater stake in restricting access to legal services than did its
42 Auerbach, supra note 26 at 49.
43 Ibid at 102.
44 b& at 104.
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British counterpart. Since the bulk of personal injury work involved
claims against corporations, the Associations' restrictive measures
protected the commercial interests which in turn supported the Bar's
governing elites. As a result, the policies were rigourously, if selectively,
applied to deny both the struggling attorneys the tools to compete and
the less fortunate individuals the means of redress.
IV. THE CANADIAN MODEL
A. Consolidation of Disciplinary Authority
The first step in comparing American and British experiences
with those of the Canadian Bar involves a review of its Law Societies'
developing powers from the 1870s to 1920s. Throughout the nineteenth
century, the courts dominated disciplinary review of both solicitors and
barristers. Their jurisdiction was limited to the former, but because
distinctions were nominal and bodies such as the Law Society of Upper
Canada were reluctant to condemn the latter "in the absence of previous
action on the part of the courts,"45 they effectively held the authority to
define and apply appropriate standards of conduct to all practitioners.
In the 1870s, however, the Law Societies began to expand their
independent disciplinary roles. The Law Society of Upper Canada
assumed concurrent jurisdiction over the rules and regulations governing
its members, whether solicitors or barristers, by Ontario statutes in 1876
and 1881. 46 The Society appointed a standing Discipline Committee in
1877 and, in subsequent years, developed a thorough procedure to deal
with complaints of misconduct. While originally reluctant to abandon
their power in such matters, Ontario courts became increasingly
deferential to the Law Society's authority.47 They retained their right to
review the Society's decisions on appeal, but after 1923 demanded that
disciplinary applications be heard by the Society's own discipline
committee.48
Other provincial Societies carried out similar consolidations. By
its charter in 1877, the Law Society of Manitoba acquired a limited
45 Professionalization of the Ontario Bar, supra note 30 at 232.
46 An Act to amend the Laws respecting the Law Society, S.O. 1876, c. 31; andAn Act to extend
the powers of the Law Society in Upper Canada, S.O. 1881, c. 17.
47 Professionalization of the Ontario Bar, supra note 30 at 253.
48 bid at 263.
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degree of power over its members which, subject to court appeal,
became absolute in 1926. 9 The Law Society of Alberta, formed in 1907
after the province's incorporation, successfully lobbied for a greater
disciplinary role in 1921. And while a less-developed complaint
procedure attracted the courts' review throughout the 1920s, judicial
decisions respected the Society's definitions of unprofessional conduct5o0
The Law Society of British Columbia's similar jurisdiction stemmed
from provincial statutes in 1874 and 1877 and, as with the other bodies,
was subject merely to an appellate court's procedural review.51
In his study of the Law Society of Upper Canada during this
period, Cole attributes the governing bodies' accumulation of power to
their growing professional self-consciousness52 Establishing complaint
mechanisms, defining misconduct, and expelling offenders from their
ranks, Cole explains, allowed law societies "to purge the profession of
those who bring disgrace upon their brethren"53 and thus legitimize their
autonomous control of its membership. At the same time that it ensured
law societies' role as public protectors, however, consolidation raised the
possibility that their disciplinary authority could be used to the detriment
of certain professional and public elements it was intended to serve.
Courts could ensure that their procedures were fair and legislatures
could always revoke their powers, but until the latter occurred the
societies could impose whatever ethical ideology they chose on the
Canadian legal profession.
B. The Changing Society, Practice, and the Professional Elites
Assessing the manner in which Law Societies used their power
requires consideration of the pressures which transformed Canadian
society, the nature of Canadian legal practice, and the composition of its
leadership in the first half of the twentieth century. The Societies' first
49 D. Gibson & L. Gibson, Substantial Justice: Law and Lawyers in Manitoba 1670-1970
(Winnipeg. Peguis, 1972) at 252. See The Law SocietyAct, S.M. 1877, c. 14.
50 P.M. Sibenik, "'rhe Black Sheep': The Disciplining of Territorial and Alberta Lawyers,
1885-1928" (1988) 3 Can. J. L. & Soe'y 109 at 114-17. See The Statute LawAmendmentAct, S.A.
1921, c. 5, amending The Legal Profession Act, S.A. 1907, c. 20.
51See LegalProfessions Ac4 1874, S.B.C. 1874, No. 18; An Act to consolidate the Laws relating
to the Legal Professions in this Province, 1877, S.B.C. 1877, No. 24; and A. Watts, Lex Liberorum Rez:
Histoy of the Law Society of British Columbia 1869-1973 (West Vancouver A. Watts, 1973) at 78.
52 Professionalization of the Ontario Bar, supra note 30 at 263.
53 kid at 227.
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concerns must have been with the growth and concentration of their
membership. As Cole indicates, the Ontario Bar's anxiety about the
rapid growth of the profession dated from the 1840s:
In 1846, potential lawyers were warned, "Lawyers are not wanted: Canada swarms with
them; and they multiply in the province so fast, that the demand is not by any means
equal to the supply."
5 4
From 1,201 lawyers in 1881, the Bar grew at a rate sometimes 1.25 per
cent greater than the annual population growth and reached 2,556
lawyers by 1936.55 Sibenik documents an even more dramatic influx in
Alberta, as its Bar bloated from 166 practitioners in 1908 to 562 in
1915.56 As it expanded, moreover, the profession became increasingly
concentrated in urban settings. Elizabeth Bloomfield describes such a
pattern in Ontario:
The numbers of communities in which lawyers practised dropped from the high of 217
centres in 1900 to 192 in 1912 and 182 in 1920. Only in Toronto and Hamilton did the
numbers of lawyers grow steadily.5 7
Expansion and concentration created two problems. First, a
larger Bar made regulation more difficult and, as Sibenik indicates, was
another reason for the societies' assumption of disciplinary power. More
important, however, increasing numbers in limited territories led to
escalating competition, which both inspired protectionist policies from
the Bar's elite and pressured struggling lawyers to breach those policies
in order to survive.
The type, as well as the number of legal practices was changing
during this period as Canada asserted itself as an industrial nation. By
1921, according to Newman, "cities had grown drastically"58 and had
absorbed over one-half of the nation's formerly rural population.
Canada experienced a "parallel expansion in industry, commerce and
54 CJ. Cole, "A Developmental Market: Growth Rates, Competition and Professional
Standards in the Ontario Legal Profession, 1881-1936" (1984) 7 Can.-U.S. LJ. 231 at 234
[hereinafter "A Developmental Market"].
5 5 Ibid at 232.
5 6 Sibenik, supra note 50 at 112.
5 7 E. Bloomfield, "Lawyers as Members of Urban Business Elites in Southern Ontario, 1860
to 1920" in C. Wilton, ed., Essays in the History of Canadian Law: Beyond the Law: Lawyers and
Business in Canada, 1830 to 1930, voL 4 (Toronto: Osgoode Society, 1990) 112 at 120.
58 J.F. Newman, "Reaction and Change: A Study of the Ontario Bar, 1880 to 1920" (1974) 32
U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 51 at 51.
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technology."59 Capital investment in manufacturing increased from
$165,302,623 in 1880 to $2,923,667,011 in 1920, and the gross value of
manufacturing output grew from $469,847,886 to $3,706,544,997 during
the same period.60 Railways, utility services, the "construction industry,
iron and steel, electrical industries, [and] automobiles"61 were subject to
increasing investment and corporate concentration in the first decades of
the twentieth century. And to supply needed capital, chartered banks,
"mortgage and loan, insurance, and trust companies"62 expanded their
operations, while "fledgling stock markets developed in Toronto and
Montreal."63
Wilton describes how this economic expansion triggered
demands for new forms of legal services:
The expansion of industry demanded several changes: incorporation to form limited-
liability companies; more complex contracts with employees and business associates; a
more varied array of securities instruments at a time when capital imports were
increasing, the elaboration of defences against greater government regulation; and the
ability of firms to function in more than one jurisdiction. All of these changes placed
increasing demands on the lawyers.6 4
As Auerbach observes with respect to the American Bar, economic
growth spawned the "newly emerging corporate lawyer whose strength
was drawing up agreements and conducting negotiations"65 rather than
litigating past errors. Employed by commercial powers, whether in a
preventive capacity or as advocates for their interests, Canadian
corporate lawyers rose to similar professional heights similar to their
American counterparts. In analyzing the motives for their partnership in
the late nineteenth century, Cole finds that the "best known Canadian
lawyers" 66 at that time, D'Alton McCarthy and Britton Bath Osler,
joined forces in 1882 in order to lay the foundation for a "lucrative
591bid
60 1bid
61 C. Wilton, "Introduction: Beyond the Law-Lawyers and Business in Canada, 1830 to
1930" in Wilton, ed., supra note 57, 3 at 18 [hereinafter "Beyond the law"].
62 bU at 16.
63Tbid
64 Ibid. at 18.
65 1bid at 17.
66 CJ. Cole, "McCarthy, Osler, Hoskin, and Creelman, 1882 to 1902: Establishing a
Reputation, Building a Practice" [hereinafter "Building a Practice"] in Wilton, ed., supra note 57 at
149.
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corporate practice" 67 serving railways, banks, and insurance companies.
Such famous lawyers as Toronto's Zebulon A. Lash and Alexander
Mackenzie, the Halifax firm of Harris, Henry, and Cahan, and Alberta's
R.B. Bennett, similarly catered to utility companies and railways, and
likewise exemplified the rewards of satisfying corporate needs for legal
services.68
With their increasing fame and financial success, corporate
lawyers acquired greater roles as leaders of the profession. Despite
more democratic election procedures than those of the early nineteenth
century, the professional elite continued to dominate the law societies'
convocations. And while asserting that corporate lawyers dominated the
elite might be inaccurate, such practitioners did assume important roles
in the regulation of the profession. John Hoskin, partner in McCarthy
and Osler's Toronto law firm, was the first chairman of the Law Society
of Upper Canada's Discipline Committee, was instrumental in
developing and expanding its hearing procedures,69 and became the
Society's Treasurer in 1914. Joining his father's firm in 1895,70
McCarthy's son D'Alton Lally succeeded Hoskin as Discipline
Committee chair, held the post into the late 1930s, and served as
Treasurer from 1939 to 1944.
C. Stratification of the Profession in Canada
As in Britain and the United States, the bodies governing
Canadian lawyers had always been controlled by their elites. Like the
British Inns and the Law Society, therefore, such bodies had the
potential to enforce an ethical ideology detrimental to practitioners
excluded from the elite. But as the aristocratic elite of the early
nineteenth century was gradually replaced by a new class of lawyers
serving big business, professional discipline may also have been used to
protect the corporate interests which supported that ruling class.
According to Wilton, attorneys meeting new demands for legal services
shared their clients' values, "interests and difficulties":
67Ibida at 155.
68 "Beyond the Law," supra note 61 at 16-18.
69 Law Society of Upper Canada Archives, Series 1-01, Minutes of Convocation, vol. 1 (28
December 1880) 591-94; Law Society of Upper Canada Archives, Proceedings of Convocation, vol.
1 (16 May 1881) 48-49.
70 "Building a Practice," supra note 66 at 163.
[VOL 32 NO. I
1]AHfial Conscience"
Mhose who promoted what might be called a "business viewpoint" did so ... because
their work experience both within and outside the law had made them a part of the
business community.71
By assuming corporate concerns and the positions from which to voice
those concerns, the emerging legal elite in Canada gained the power to
uphold its interests against a professional underclass in the same manner
described in Auerbach's study of the American Bar.
The doors to the Canadian legal profession seemed to be locked
to certain classes of qualified lawyers. As Clara Brett Martin's
experience in Ontario demonstrates, even if a woman could persuade
either the Legislature or the Law Society to admit her to the Bar, she
would be looked upon as "an interloper, if not a curiosity" 72 and would
have to limit the scope of her practice "to escape criticism and censure
from the public and from other members of the legal profession." 73
Bora Laskin's inability to obtain employment after completing his LL.M.
at Harvard in 1937 indicates the Ontario Bar's similar prejudice against
Jews. As Bickenbach relates, none of Laskin's supporters "thought it
particularly exceptional that a Jew would find it extremely difficult to
find employment as a lawyer in Toronto" 74 and thus were happy to find
the future Chief Justice of Canada a job writing headnotes for the
Canadian Abridgement.
Two brief passages in E. Fabre Surveyer's otherwise blissful
recitation on the Bench and Bar of Montreal in 1907 suggest French-
Canadian lawyers' exclusion from lucrative practice:
[Tihe public must not take to the letter the figures mentioned from time to time in the
papers, as representing the average earnings of leaders of the Bar. Then there are the
others, those who are not leaders, the 500 advocates who with equal ardour, but less
success, try to compete with their 70 more prosperous brothers. 75
And further:
71 "Beyond the Law," supra note 61 at 32.
72 C.B. Backhouse, "'To Open the Way for Others of my Sex': Clara Brett Martin's Career as
Canada's First Woman Lawyer" (1985) 1 Can. . Women & L 1 at 22.
73 D.K Weisberg, "Barred from the Bar. Women and Legal Education in the United States
1870-1890" (1977) 28 . Legal Educ. 485 at 496.
74 J .E. Bickenbach, "Lawyers, Law Professors, and Racism in Ontario" (1989) 96 Queen's Q.
585 at 594.
75 E.F. Surveyer, The Bench and Bar of Montreal (Montreal: ap 1907) at 30-31.
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It must also be said that the Montreal Bar has seldom received from the powers, its fair
share in the distribution of legal work. In matters of general interest our lawyers are too
often ignored.76
Whether Surveyer's "powers" were members of the Bar's elite or the
large, presumably corporate or commercial, interests they served, it
seems clear that many French-Canadian lawyers were excluded from
certain careers by their "more prosperous brothers."
A short history of Black lawyers' experiences in Ontario offers
further evidence of stratification. Talbot indicates that Blacks could only
article with. other Black or Jewish lawyers and "were not welcomed into
traditional partnerships with whites"77 until well into the 1960s. Such
marginalization, he explains, impaired their ability to develop a
profitable practice:
The opportunity for Blacks however, was made all the more difficult for several reasons.
During the period as it is today, the most lucrative form of practice was that dealing with
real estate transactions and commercial or corporate representation. Since Blacks did
not have ready access to such clients the ability to earn a prosperous living was greatly
diminished.
78
While Blacks represented a minute percentage of the Ontario
Bar, their experience, combined with those of female, Jewish, and
French-Canadian lawyers, implies a pattern of stratification similar to
that found by Auerbach. And as the profession probably absorbed
portions of the immigration boom at the century's turn, 79 the possibility
that elites used disciplinary codes and procedures to further marginalize
"alien" lawyers existed in the same manner as it did in the United States.
V. CBA CANONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGY
A. Formation of the cBA and its Canons of Legal Ethics
The formation of the Canadian Bar Association (CBA) in 1914
and its adoption of Canons of Ethics in 1920 provide some indication
that the Bar's elite used professional discipline to perpetuate inequities
in the profession. As the impetus for its formation stemmed from a
76 1ba at 31.
77 LC Talbot, "History of Blacks in the Law Society of Upper Canada" (1990) 24 L Soc. Gaz.
65 at 66.
78 bid
79 "Beyond the Law," supra note 61 at 14.
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speech Viscount Haldane delivered at an ABA meeting in Montreal in
1913, the CBA maintained close British and American ties from its
inception. Its proposed federation with "the four Inns of Court and the
Law Society of England ... [and] the American Bar Association"80 in
1922 confirmed its affinity with those regulatory bodies. Furthermore,
the men forming the CBA, whom the Canadian Law Times described as
"[p]robably the most distinguished gathering of Canadian lawyers that
ever met together at one time,"81 exemplified the type of professional
elites forming the Inns', the Law Societies', and the ABA's leadership
from their conception.
The ABA, however, had by far the greatest influence on the CBA.
As Coleman points out, the CBA developed objectives "similar to the
purposes of the American Bar Association,"82 and ABA leaders attended
its first and subsequent meetings. When concerns regarding the
profession's increasing commercialization arose in Canada, the CBA, not
surprisingly, based its response on the ABA'S treatment of similar issues.
J.A.M. Aikins, the CBA'S first president, expressed the founding elite's
concern for the profession in 1915:
[Law] is not a calling or instrumentality suited to that purpose [of making money] as is
the business of the merchant, manufacturer or miner. Persons who have thus sought to
commercialize it, to prostitute it to such an end in itself have lowered the professional
tone and so lost the respect and esteem of their fellow-practitioners and of the people.
8 3
According to Auerbach, professional unease originally focused
on two forms of legal "prostitution." The first involved lawyers' catering
to corporate interests, while the second focused on unconnected
practitioners' efforts to compete in tight markets. Yet Aikins' comments
imply that, as in the United States, only the latter deserved professional
condemnation. It did not fall on esteemed CBA leaders like John
Hoskin 84-who became wealthy by serving commercial interests of the
"merchant, manufacturer or miner"-but on the professional underclass
whose quest for survival necessitated such commercial practices.
The CBA addressed such concerns by codifying professional
concepts derived almost exclusively from the ABA'S Canons of Ethics.
Organized under five duties-to the state, the court, the client, the
8 0 E.H. Coleman, "The Canadian Bar Association" (1948) 26 Can. Bar Rev. 3 at 8.
8 1 "Personal" (March 1914) Can. LT. 244 at 252.
82 Coleman, supra note 80 at 4.
83 "Advancing the Science of Jurisprudence in Canada" (Presidential Address to the Canadian
Bar Association, Montreal, May 1915) (1915) Can. LT. 372 at 373.
84 Coleman, supra note 80 at 7.
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fellow lawyer, and to her or himself-the practitioner's guide reiterated
the restrictive principles with respect to advertising, fee tariffs, and
"stirring" held by the British and American Bar. Such standards,
adopted by the Law Societies as their disciplinary regulations, limited a
struggling attorney's ability to compete in a crowded sector. In his
description of the Canons' objectives, furthermore, the Convener of the
CBA Committee on Legal Ethics, Angus MacMurchy, made it clear that
the code was aimed at a specific class of lawyers:
In view of the changed and changing conditions of this country, and the large number of
students now admitted to the practice, many of whom come from various countries whose
traditions and surroundings have not been similar to those of our own and the
Motherland, the time may be considered as having arrived when it is necessary to reduce
to writing for the information of the members of the Bar and the guidance of our law
students some of the most important general principles governing the conduct of the
profession.8 5
On one level, MacMurchy's paternalistic tone is typical of a Bar's senior
member addressing aspiring colleagues. His singling out of immigrant
lawyers, however, adds a racial dimension to the code's purposes.
Considering such lawyers' marginalized position in an increasingly
competitive market, it raises the possibility that the Canons' inhibiting
measures sustained not only the professional but also an ethnic
stratification among the practitioners they governed.
B. SolicitorAdverising
The canon prohibiting solicitor advertising, for example, limited
lawyers' ability to cope with problems of client attraction. In preaching
that the "best advertisement for a lawyer is the establishment of a well
merited reputation for personal capacity and fidelity to trust,"86 the CBA
standard echoed ABA'S Canon 27. A prohibition on circulars, personal
communication, agents, or self-praise as a means of obtaining retainers
was irrelevant to a legal elite whose social or corporate connections
supplied their clientele. To struggling lawyers, however, the duty "to
themselves" not to advertise was crucial. By virtue of prohibition on
circulating information, such lawyers were prevented from acquiring the
professional and ethical reputation essential to a successful practice.
The Law Society of Upper Canada's enforcement of the Canon
reveals its disparate effects. As the Society's records show, the pressure
85 "Report of the Committee on Legal Ethics" (1919) 39 Can. LT. 702 at 704.
8 6 Canon 5(3), "Canons of Ethics" (1920) 5 CBA Papers 261 at 264.
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to advertise dated from the late nineteenth century. In Convocation
8 7
and in legal periodicals, solicitors complained both of advertising and, as
this 1890 Canadian Law Times editorial reflects, the Law Society's
inaction in dealing with offenders:
Sensational advertising is a growing evil and not without a baneful effect upon the whole
profession; here is ground for action; but though many instances are brought directly to
the notice of the Benchers they pass without observation.8 8
In what Cole describes as two decades of tremendous growth in
the profession,8 9 advertising was a "growing evil" only to those it
threatened. Non-advertisers complained about those who advertised
because of the "baneful effects" not on their integrity, but on their
practices' viability. In smaller markets for services outside Toronto,
where the majority of complaints originated, and in the metropolitan
underclass, practitioners faced obstacles from which the Toronto elite
were immune. But because the elite controlled the Discipline
Committee,90 practitioners' complaints were dismissed by a body with no
stake in enforcing such ethical restrictions. Issues of solicitor advertising
raised in 1876 and 1884,91 for example, warranted neither action nor
more than a passing mention in the Convocation Minutes. And when a
complaint regarding a patent-solicitor's similar activities arose in 1896,92
the Law Society claimed its Discipline Committee had no power to deal
with the matter.
The Society reacted very differently when concerns over solicitor
advertising re-emerged in the 1930s. After hearing a complaint
regarding two solicitors who published their "card" under a telephone
book heading designating their specialty, the Discipline Committee
issued this statement in November 1938:
These advertisements, in the opinion of Convocation, constitute a departure from the
traditions of the Society and tend to lower the tone of the lawyer's high calling and, in the
87 Law Society of Upper Canada Archives, Series 1-01, Minutes of Convocation, vol. 6 (8
December 1876) 38 [hereinafter Minutes (8 December 1876)]; Proceedings of Convocation,
Toronto, vol. 1 (12 September 1884) 152 [hereinafter Proceedings (12 September 1884)]; Law
Society of Upper Canada Archives, Series 1-01, Minutes of Convocation, "Discipline Committee
Report," vol. 12 (17 November 1896) 18 [hereinafter Minutes (17 November 1896)].
88 "Editorial Review" (1890) 10 Can. LT. 86 at 88.
8 9 "A Developmental Market," supra note 54 at 233.
90 "Professionalization of the Ontario Bar," supra note 30 at 238.
91 Minutes (8 December 1876), supra note 87; and Proceedings (12 September 1884), supra
note 87.
92 bidL; and Minutes (17 November 1896), supra note 87.
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opinion of Convocation, the same should not be tolerated; and in the event of the
practice being continued Convocation will take the necessary steps to discipline those
solicitors who, in the opinion of Convocation, are guilty of unprofessional conduct in the
matter of advertising, contrary to the well established standard of the Society.93
Convocation's stem response to a seemingly minor violation indicates its
changing attitude toward solicitor advertising. Previously, the "well
established standard of the Society" had not been enforced by the
Discipline Committee, which claimed that such complaints were beyond
its review. In the late 1930s, however, the Society not only asserted its
authority over such matters, but prescribed stringent standards for its
members' practices.
The statement certainly surprised the Bar when it was published.
That practitioners and firms, unsure of the proper standard, repeatedly
entreated the Law Society to assess their advertising practices in 1938
and 1939, confirms the artificial nature of the prohibition. The
definitions framed to fit the prohibition clearly favoured the Society's
elite as they generally forbade any means by which a lawyer or a firm
might set themselves apart from other lawyers or firms. As the
complaint which inspired its action illustrates, the Society prohibited a
lawyer's declaration of his specialty in non-legal publications such as
telephone books or newspapers. 94 It allowed patent and admiralty
lawyers to declare their practices' limited scope, but prohibited
statements like "litigation, conveyancing, insurance, investments"95 in a
published legal card. The Society further condemned solicitors
advertising "private funds for mortgages,"96 "planned economy
service,"97 and "money to loan."98 It even "expressed disapproval" 99 of
those using bold type in telephone books without going "so far to say it
was not proper."100 A solicitor could state both his specialty and large
93 Law Society of Upper Canada Archives, Series 5-03, Discipline Committee-General Files,
[hereinafter "Discipline Committee-General Files"], "Solicitor's Advertising," File No. 05-03-25 (6
October 1938).
94 Ibid
95 "Discipline Committee-General Files" (9 February 1939).
96 "Discipline Committee-General Files" (31 March 1939).
9 7"Discipline Committee-General Files" (27 January 1939).
98 "Discipline Committee-General Files" (17 May 1939).
99 "Discipline Committee-General Files" (19 February 1940).
100/bI.
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"representative clients"101 in legal lists and directories, but that
remained a specific exception to the Society's general prohibition.
Such limitations debilitated a struggling lawyer's capacity to
establish a professional reputation. The clients that a less-connected
lawyer might acquire would probably consult a telephone book or
newspaper before a law list. The relaxation of the rule pertaining to the
latter source aided firms which were retained by mentionable clients
such as banks, insurance companies, and municipalities, but was
irrelevant to a lawyer without similar retainers. What such a lawyer
needed was a means to make infrequent users of legal services choose
his or her practice over those of the many competitors. Persons
consulting a telephone book to obtain a divorce lawyer would probably
choose a lawyer listed under "Lawyers-Divorce," rather than one with
no such designation. Such persons might even consult a lawyer whose
name appeared in bold print first or be attracted, unlike wealthier
individuals or corporations, by the prospect of obtaining a small loan or
mortgage.
The Society, however, forbade the assertion of competitive
advantage. In a complaint coming before it in 1939, and apparently
involving the same patent-solicitor with whom it dealt in 1896, the
Discipline Committee condemned his assertions in a circular that his was
Ontario's oldest patent firm, that he had special skills as a mechanical
engineer, that the firm preferred -settlement over litigation, and that
"there is not an infringement case contemplated ... which has not been
won."102 This form of "puffing," the Committee held, was "entirely
contrary not only to the ethics of the Society but to the rules of
Convocation."103 Yet, as the impugned solicitor's response to the
Committee's holding confirms, such puffing was not unreasonable in a
competitive environment. In responding to the Committee's inquiry as
to whether his "circular calls attention to [his] qualifications as a lawyer
in patent cases," 1°4 the solicitor answered, "Of course it does." 105 His
response to the Committee's recitation of the circular's details reflects
only grudging acceptance of their policy:
101 "Discipline Committee-General Files" (30 January 1947).
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I think that is all true. Of course I may be wrong, but I do not think there is any untruth
in that as far as I am aware ... but it may be unduly puffing.106
To the solicitor, asserting one's qualifications would only be wrong if
untrue. Since his statements were accurate, therefore, he could not
understand the Committee's concern to which he, like many others,
ultimately deferred.
The exchange reveals the divergence between the elite's and
other lawyers' conceptions of acceptable conduct as the Society asserted
its disciplinary authority in the 1930s. As in the 1890s, the elite ignored
the competitive pressures which rendered some advertising practices not
only reasonable but necessary. They did not, however, ignore the
practices themselves.
Several patterns might explain the elite's new "stake" in the issue
and unprecedented vigour in dealing with offenders. First, it might
simply have been a function of its consolidated power and elevated
professional self-esteem. With codified standards of conduct after 1920
and unabridged authority after 1923, the Law Society acquired a new
sense of public legitimacy and professionalism which may have inspired
the Canon's active enforcement. The elite's interests, furthermore,
might not have been as free from competition as they were in the 1890s.
The number of lawyers had doubled since that period and, as the
examples of the British Inns and Law Society indicate, the elite may have
wished to keep a depression market for legal services on a plane which
would maximize the value of their connected positions.
Auerbach's conclusions with respect to the American Bar's
emerging corporate elite might also be relevant. It is clear that
limitations on advertising restricted public knowledge of available legal
services. They likewise impeded lawyers' ability to obtain retainers and
might have precluded persons with potential claims from realizing that
both redress and assistance in obtaining it were available. As some such
claims, especially in personal injury cases, would have been directed
against the wealthy interests the elite began to serve in the twentieth
century, limiting potential claimants' access to information about
remedies would protect those interests and enhance the elite's social and
professional esteem.
Whether ethnic prejudice influenced the Canon's enforcement is
less clear. The Society did, in 1939, order a solicitor to cease
emphasizing his Ukrainian heritage in his advertisements:
1061bi&
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While it may be an advantage to the ignorant Ukrainian in the ... District to know that
there was a solicitor of his own race, and who doubtless speaks his own language,
available, should he require a lawyer, on the other hand it does not seem fair to other
struggling solicitors in the same District that an attempt should be made by advertising to
emphasize race or religion or any other affiliation.
10 7
On one level, the order reiterates the Society's steadfast refusal to
recognize competitive advantage. "Alien" lawyers' major asset was their
ability to communicate with clientele from similar ethnic backgrounds.
By forbidding advertising of this kind, therefore, the Law Society
impaired such lawyers' ability to establish reputations within the
communities on which their practices largely depended. But the
prohibition, whether intentionally or not, may also have inhibited ethnic
minorities from asserting legitimate claims. Gaining access to a lawyer
who spoke the same language and shared the same heritage might
alleviate an immigrant's unease with unfamiliar and imposing legal
procedures. Without such assistance, however, an immigrant might
abandon the claim and thereby sacrifice both the right to recover
damages and a solicitor's opportunity for much needed employment.
C. Fee Tariffs
The canon which attributed ethical status to fee tariffs had
similarly negative effects on marginalized practitioners and individuals.
Under a lawyer's duty to the client, the fee tariff rule paralleled the ABA's
Canon 12:
[A lawyer] is entitled to reasonable compensation for his services but he should avoid
charges which either over-estimate or under-value the service rendered. When possible
he should adhere to established tariffs. The client's ability to pay cannot justify a charge
in excess of the value of the service, though his poverty may require a less charge or even
none at all.108
Prohibiting over-estimation and promoting pro bono work suggest the
CBA's support of universal access to legal services. Making fee tariffs an
ethical minimum rather than maximum, however, contradicts the
inference that public interest was the Association's sole concern. As
described with respect to the British Law Society, the tariff rule
constituted a type of fee-fixing which prevented competition from
negatively affecting the whole profession's charges. It maintained
artificially high rates set by Bar Associations and Law Societies and, in
107 "Discipline Committee-General Files" (13 May 1939).
108 Canons, supra note 35 at 7-8.
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so doing, legitimized the professional elite's even higher fees while
rendering poorer claimants dependent on generous practitioners for
assistance such claimants otherwise could not afford.
The rule further limited practitioners' ability to establish a
professional reputation. Tariff schedules arose not to prevent
overcharging, but because undercutting established lawyers' rates was an
effective means for struggling lawyers to compensate for their
competitive disadvantages. And while attempts at fixing minimums
failed in local organizations such as the Carleton Law Association in the
1890s,109 such associations had more success as they gained greater
legitimacy after the century's turn. The Carleton and Hamilton Law
Associations implemented effective fee tariffs by 1910,10 and the
Manitoba Law Society published a schedule of "suggested solicitor's
fees"111 for its members in 1920. With the Canon's infusion of ethical
dimensions into rate minimums, therefore, lawyers lost an important
means of compensating for their lack of social and corporate
connections. They could perhaps charge their poorer clients less or not
at all, but the rule significantly limited their ability to obtain other work
by declaring their most important competitive tool "unprofessional."
D. "Stiring" and Contingency Fees
The CBA'S prohibition of "stirring" imposed the greatest
impediment on struggling lawyers and individuals. The rule that those
who "stir up strife or litigation"112 violate their duty "to the state"
incorporated both the ABA'S Canon 28 and Lord Abinger's description of
the common law of maifitenance in Findon v. Parker:113
The law of maintenance ... is confined to cases where a man improperly, and for the
purpose of stirring up litigation and strife, encourages others either to bring actions, or to
make defences which they have no right to make. 114
109 Professionalization of the Ontario Bar, supra note 30 at 299-300.
1101biL. at 300-01.
111 Gibson & Gibson, supra note 49 at 252.
112 Supra note 86 at 261.
113 (1843) 11 M. & W. 675 (Ex.D.) [hereinafter Findon].
114 1bid at 682.
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Maintenance, and with it the "greater atrocity"115 of champerty, applied
not only to lawyers but to all persons at common law. Any meddling
with a claim, or entering into fee arrangements contingent on a claim's
success, subjected the offender to a fine and the claim to dismissal. The
effect of such a doctrine was to reinforce the ethical ideology underlying
the Canons' prohibition of advertising and tariff undercutting. Assessing
as illegal the means by which a solicitor might secure clients and assist
them in obtaining legal remedies, the rule perpetuated professional and
social stratification. It denied the underclass opportunities to establish
their reputations and challenge the governing elite's leadership. At the
same time, it ensured that poorer individuals wronged by wealthier or
commercial interests remained underprivileged and uncompensated.
The Law Society of Upper Canada's disciplining of a lawyer for
"improper solicitation" in 1939 illustrates the rule's disparate impact.
After an elderly immigrant woman was injured while alighting from a
Toronto streetcar, a practitioner present at the scene made notes,
obtained witnesses' names and addresses, and took statements.
Subsequently, after learning of the family's poverty, he agreed to take on
the case for a percentage of the damages award to be determined "after
the case was clear. '116 Without the lawyer's efforts, the information
supporting the claim might not have been gathered and the woman
might not have obtained legal assistance. Without the fee arrangement,
moreover, available information and aid was irrelevant. Yet, to the
solicitor's and the woman's disappointment, the Law Society declared
both practices "improper."
As the lawyer's activities constituted common law offences,
jurisprudence mitigated the Law Society's responsibility to a certain
degree. Abinger's dicta in Findon, however, identified the room
available for the Society and the CBA to support more aggressive
solicitation and contingency arrangements:
[I]f a man were to see a poor person in the street oppressed and abused, and without the
means of obtaining redress, and furnished him with money or employed an attorney to
obtain redress for his wrongs, it would require a very strong argument to convince me
that that man could be said to be stirring up litigation and strife.
1 17
Abinger's statement confirmed that litigation and strife are not
necessarily synonymous. As renowned commentators such as Riddell
115 Goodman v. R., [19391 S.C.R. 446 at 448.
11 6 Law Society of Upper Canada Archives, Series 1-01, Minutes of Convocation, "Discipline
Committee Report," vol. 21 (19 October 1939) 71 [hereinafter Minutes (19 October 1939)].
11 7 Supra note 113 at 682.
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admitted, prohibiting contingency contracts was "artificial" 118 and, as
need justified their use, the CBA could have sidestepped unfavourable
jurisprudence with a "poverty" exemption similar to that in the fee tariff
Canon. A 1938 Quebec decision in R. v. Bordoffl1 9 did hold any
acceptance of fees to violate the charity requirement and perhaps
indicated such a provision's unacceptability. Yet had the CBA liberalized
the means of serving those "without the means of obtaining redress" in
1920, it might have justified the exception's later expansion on the basis
of public policy.
The greater influence on the outcome, it seems, was the
governing elite's stake in the prohibitions. By reinforcing common law
doctrines of maintenance and champerty, the legal elite restricted many
claimants' ability to recover damages from the corporate interests which
sustained the elite's professional esteem. Law Society Benchers and
Discipline Committee members represented powerful entities like the
Toronto Transit Commission. Their concern for limiting corporate
liability prevailed over any consideration of an elderly immigrant's access
to legal services, and thus they strictly enforced rather than relaxed the
Canon's standard. The few examples of disciplined practitioners in
Ontario 20 and British Columbia1 21 are a misleading indication of what
was likely a multitude of unacknowledged or abandoned claims which,
without the restrictions, might have proceeded. Denying solicitors
much-needed employment and needy persons the means of redress, the
Canon perpetuated inequities within and beyond the profession and, in
combination with restrictions on advertising and tariff undercutting,
formed an "artificial" ideology which subordinated contrary interests to
those of the governing "conscience."
VI. ENFORCING POLITICAL IDEOLOGY
The Law Societies enforced political ideology in a similar
manner. While instances of its use for such purposes are infrequent,
118 Supra note 2 at 142.
119 (1938), 70 C.C.C. 35 (Que. Ct. Sess. P.).
12 0 Law Society of Upper Canada Archives, Series 1-01, Minutes of Convocation, "Discipline
Committee Report" vol. 20 (16 June 1938) 329-33; Law Society of Upper Canada Archives, Series
1-01, Minutes of Convocation, "Discipline Committee Report" vol. 20 (16 February 1939) 509-14;
Minutes (19 October 1939), supra note 116; and Law Society of Upper Canada Archives, Series 1-
01, Minutes of Convocation, "Discipline Committee Report" vol. 21 (18 January 1940) 112-17.
121 Watts, supra note 51 at 80-82.
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Canadian regulatory bodies expelled radical elements from their ranks
in the same way as did the British and American Bars. Sibenik's study of
the Alberta Bar describes its disciplinary action against Gilbert LaRue
for his involvement in a United Farmers of Alberta (uFA) protest. In
1922, the group issued a circular condemning a St. Paul de M6tis firm's
"overly zealous" 122 methods of debt collection:
This Sunday Meeting will bring forth those who really defend the poor farmer instead of
encumbering them.
Now is the time for these hypocrites [St. Paul de M~tis firm's lawyers] to make an
appearance and defend themselves before the public ... It is about time that someone
should get up and speak in the name of the poor farmer, shouting to these crooks, halt,
you have gone far enough.
12 3
Accusations that the lawyers were "hypocrites" and "crooks" border on
defamation, but do not in themselves seem to warrant LaRue's
disbarment. Additionally, the uFA published the circular under its local
president's name and the Law Society of Alberta had no proof that
LaRue was the author of the statements. It rather appears that the
Society punished LaRue not for the circular, but for his affiliation with
the radical group's protest against two lawyers respected by the Bar.
LaRue and the UFA challenged practices probably adopted by many of
the Alberta professional elite and confronted the ideological bases on
which these practices rested. By striking LaRue from its rolls, therefore,
the Law Society demonstrated its ability and willingness to declare
certain beliefs "unprofessional" for a lawyer to promulgate.
The case of Martin v. Law Society of British Columbia1 24 provides
a better example of the enforcement of political ideology. In July 1948,
William John Martin applied to the Society's Benchers for call to the
Bar. Even though his application met the requirements, it was denied
under the Society's discretionary authority to refuse an applicant who
"has not satisfied them that he is a person of good repute."125 Martin
was a declared Communist and member of the Labour Progressive
(Communist) Party of Canada. He came to that position "after many
years of thought, study and practice [as a] man of mature years"126 and
122 Sibenik, supra note 50 at 125.
123 bid at 126.
124 [1950] 3 D.L.R. 173 (B.C.CA) [hereinafter Martin].
125 /ba at 174.
126Ibid at 186.
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renounced any activity but "education and social organization 127 as
means of achieving a Communist state. He had previously served in the
Royal Canadian Air Force and was prepared to declare his continuing
allegiance to Canada and the Crown through the barrister's oath. Such
assurances did not alleviate the Society's concerns, however, as they
found that Martin's questionable affiliations eradicated his "good
repute" and rendered him unfit for practice.
After unsuccessfully applying to invalidate the Society's refusal,
Martin turned to the British Columbia Court of Appeal for remedy. In
affirming the trial decision, however, O'Halloran J. upheld the Law
Society's position that Marxist morality was wholly inconsistent with the
values the profession promoted. To Communists, he stated, "anything is
right that advances the world revolution, and everything else is wrong
and must be ruthlessly destroyed. '128 He cited a legitimate, if extreme,
Marxist source to support his contention and made a similarly legitimate
argument that persons conspiring to violently overthrow the ruling
classes could not accept the barrister's oath of "duty to the State to
maintain its integrity and its law and not to aid, counsel or assist any man
to act in any way contrary to those laws."129 Yet O'Halloran J.'s
judgment went beyond merely condemning Communist activities and
declared Marxist ideological principles to be "repugnant to the ancient
and honourable profession of law."130 According to O'Halloran J., those
accepting "common-law theory and practice confess to a belief in
inherent rights of the individual diametrically opposed to the Hegelian
and Marxist concepts of the state."13 1 Even if Communists did renounce
violence, the Society and the Court decided, their questioning of the
values of individualism and free enterprise would still render them unfit
to practice a system of law which supports those values.
The Society justified its refusal to admit Martin into its ranks on
the basis of public protection. The case arose shortly after Canada's spy
trials and the establishment of a Royal Commission on Communist
1271bid at 196.
128 kid at 180.
129 Ibi. at 180 and at 190; and E. Meredith, "Communism and the British Columbia Bar"
(1950) 28 Can. Bar Rev. 893 at 899.
130Mart, supra note 124 at 187.
131 Ibid
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Espionage in 1946,132 which found that a "fifth column" had spread
among Canada's public servants. And while the Law Society's decision
reflected common patterns of suppression during this period,
O'Halloran J.'s description of the purpose of disciplinary powers
illustrates their role as an "artificial conscience":
It sometimes happens that men of unmoral and amoral outlook or unstable character, or
of little integrity, or whose object is to use the law solely to make money find their way
into the profession of law ... It is the duty of the Benchers to protect the public by
refusing admission to the practice of law, not only the type of person who will prey upon
the public for his own selfish ends, but also the type of person who professes a political
philosophy alien to our free society, and who in a time of "cold war" is little else than a
fith columnist.
1 33
On both the professional and the political levels, the Society's duty was
to persecute "alien" influences. Like the British Inns' expulsion of
nineteenth-century radicals, the American and Canadian Bars'
denunciation of Communist lawyers indicates the manner in which
regulatory bodies used similar authority and justifications to dispose of
twentieth-century radicals. Radical ideologies, like the so-called
commercial practices, were not inherently evil. But because such
ideologies were "alien" to the empowered elite, the societies and
associations deemed their proponents "unethical" and morally unfit to
be members of the elite-governed profession.
VII. CONCLUSION
In his 1977 review of Auerbach's Unequal Justice, Arthurs
cautions against limiting historical analysis of the profession to the self-
interested motivations of its elite. He admits that modern criticisms of
the profession apply to the Canadian context, but demands that
scholarship encompass the many factors inspiring the Bar's policies and
practices:
Mhe professional elite, like the profession itself, responds, not to a single predominant
influence, but to many. Its leaders understand and sympathize with the groups from
which they have come and which they primarily serve. But they also may, and doubtless
132 The Report of the Royal Commission Appointed under Order in Council P.C. 411 of February
5, 1946 to investigate the facts relating to and the circumstances surrounding the communication, by
public officials and otherpersons in positions of trust of secret and confidential information to agents of
a foreign power (Ottawa: E. Cloutier, 27 June 1946) (Commissioners: R. Taschereau & R.L.
Keliock).
133 Martin, supra note 124 at 189-90.
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do, respond to the historical circumstances in which they work, to abstractions such as
noblesse ob'ge and "the public interest" 134
Arthurs correctly discourages the separation of the elite's actions from
their historical context. The professional elite was by no means unique
in its disdain of "alien" elements such as Jews or Communists during this
period, and its responses should be measured against that historical
fabric. In many ways, moreover, the elite did indeed act in the "public
interest." In Ontario, for example, the overwhelming majority of
disbarments and suspensions were for misappropriation of clients'
monies.1 35 Sibenik finds the same pattern with respect to the Alberta
Bar,13 6 as does Watts in his description of the Law Society of British
Columbia. 137 The Law Societies' adoption of accounting rules and
compensation schemes after the 1930s likewise supports Arthurs'
conclusion that the Bar elite's "moral ledgers likely contain both debits
and credits,"138 and that legitimate public considerations often rendered
the profession's "artificial conscience" a genuine protector of the
interests its members served.
But while these perspectives are valid concerns for future
scholarship, they do not mitigate the clearly negative, and perhaps
intentional, effect that the elite's enforcement of ethical and political
ideologies had on marginalized members of the profession and society.
To a practitioner excluded from lucrative corporate careers by virtue of
race, gender, religion, or language, the cBA's prohibitions on advertising,
fee tariff undercutting, and more active solicitation limited the ability to
establish the reputation necessary for professional success. In addition,
the policies of restricting available information, inflating prices, and
banning contingency arrangements, discouraged poorer classes from
pursuing meritorious claims. Without such restrictions, disadvantaged
lawyers and individuals might have aided one another in remedying their
peripheral status. However, the corporate elite's use of regulatory
bodies' disciplinary powers to declare otherwise legitimate practices and
beliefs "unprofessional," fabricated an "artificial conscience" which
perpetuated professional and social stratification. While it is true, as
Arthurs points out, that the elites neither created inequities nor held the
13 4 Arthurs, supra note 3 at 51&
13 5 Law Society of Upper Canada Archives, Series 5-03, Discipline Committee-General
Files, "Lists of Membes Disbarred/Suspended" Fle No. 05-03-17.
13 6 Sibenik, supra note 50 at 124.
137 Watts, supra note 51 at 84-86.
138 Supra note 3 at 518.
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ultimate key for their elimination, they still bear a "burden of guilt"13 9
for adopting policies which foreclosed practitioners' and the public's
opportunities for advancement.
139 INd. at 516.
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